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HALL V. HALL: A LOSE-LOSE CASE FOR APPELLATE
JURISDICTION
Bryan Lammon *
INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, federal litigants can appeal only at the end of district court
proceedings, when all issues have been decided and all that remains is enforcing
the judgment. 1 This general limit on appellate jurisdiction is commonly called
the “final-judgment rule,” and it is a judicial gloss on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That
statute gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over only “final decisions” of the
district courts. 2 And that statute—or more accurately, judicial interpretations of
that statute that elaborate on what it means for a decision to be “final”—is the
source for most of the rules of federal appellate jurisdiction. 3
In 2018’s Hall v. Hall, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of § 1291
in the context of actions consolidated under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 4 That Rule permits district courts to consolidate multiple
actions into a single joint proceeding. 5 In Hall, the Court held that the resolution
of a single action consolidated with other actions is a “final decision,” regardless
of whether the other actions remain pending. 6 Litigants in the resolved action
can thus immediately appeal the resolution of that action. 7 The courts of appeals
had split on this issue for decades, developing four different answers to the
question of which decision in consolidated actions was a final one. 8 Hall finally
resolved this split.

* Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. Thanks to Ken Kilbert for helpful comments.
And special thanks, as always, to Nicole Porter.
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015); Catlin v.
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (discussing § 128 of the Judicial Code, the predecessor to what is
currently § 1291).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3 See Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author).
4 Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1122 (2018).
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
6 Hall, 138 S. Ct. at 1131.
7 Id.
8
Compare, e.g., In re Mass. Helicopter Airlines, Inc., 469 F.2d 439, 441–42 (1st Cir. 1972), with Bergman
v. City of Atlantic City, 860 F.2d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 1988), and Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 705 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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But the Court had no great options in deciding Hall. Its narrow reading of
§ 1291—holding that the resolution of a single action is immediately
appealable 9—was the most straightforward reading of § 1291 and the Court’s
prior decisions. But the Court adopted a practically sub-optimal rule; its holding
will likely produce multiple, related, and duplicative appeals, with the resolution
of each action being separately appealable. A better rule would generally delay
appeals until the resolution of all actions that were consolidated into the joint
proceeding. Reaching that rule, however, requires a new elaboration on § 1291
and risks injecting further uncertainty and complexity into this area of law.
Hall was thus a lose-lose case for appellate jurisdiction. The Court had to
adopt either a straightforward but unsound rule or a pragmatic one that would
add to the confusion that exists in matters of appellate jurisdiction. But Hall also
illustrates the alternative way forward: rulemaking. The situation addressed in
Hall is an ideal one for rulemaking. Indeed, given the less-than-ideal options the
Court had in Hall and the sub-optimal one that the Court picked, Hall’s legacy
might be its spurring the Rules Committee to address this matter.
In this essay, I provide background on the circuit split that led to Hall. I then
show that the Court had no great options in deciding the case. I end by explaining
how rulemaking provides a superior way forward with issues of federal appellate
jurisdiction like that addressed in Hall.
I.

THE SPLIT OVER APPEALS IN CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the liberal joinder of claims and
parties into a single action. 10 But occasionally, multiple actions are filed that
have some relation to each other. Despite some overlap in the parties or issues
(or both), the actions are filed separately, have different case numbers, and—
absent some action by the district court—proceed independently. Sometimes
these actions are filed separately because they don’t satisfy even the liberal
joinder rules. Other times plaintiffs simply choose to file separate actions.
Whatever the reason, these separate filings result in related actions proceeding
independently.
Rule 42(a) allows a district court to consolidate these separately filed actions
so long as they involve a common question of law or fact. Actions can be
consolidated for different purposes. They might be consolidated for a single
9
10

Hall, 138 S. Ct. at 1131.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 18, FED. R. CIV. 20.
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hearing. Or they might be consolidated for pretrial litigation, eventually
separated if they go to trial. Or actions can be consolidated for all purposes,
including trial. Consolidation often has some efficiency benefits—duplication
of work is reduced—and imposes few (if any) costs in district court proceedings.
Consolidated actions can create problems, however, when it comes to
appeals. The courts of appeals’ general grant of jurisdiction—28 U.S.C.
§ 1291—gives them jurisdiction over only “final decisions” of the district
courts. A final decision is normally defined as one that marks the end of district
court proceedings, when all issues have been decided and all that remains is
enforcing the judgment. 11 Until Hall, it was not clear which decision is final
when actions are consolidated. Assume a district court consolidated two
actions—Action A and Action B—and each action involved a single claim. Later
in the joint proceedings, the district court dismissed the sole claim in Action A.
The claim in Action B, however, remains pending. Before Hall, it was unclear
when the decision dismissing the claim in Action A would become final and
appealable—is the judgment in Action A final and appealable at its dismissal, or
is it not final until Action B is also resolved?
Rules exist to address a similar problem that can arise in a single, nonconsolidated action that involves multiple claims or parties. A district court
decision that resolves some (but not all) of the claims in a multi-claim or multiparty suit is normally not a final or appealable decision. 12 That’s because more—
namely, resolution of the other claims—remains to be done. But sometimes it
makes sense to allow an immediate appeal after the district court’s resolution of
some (but not all) of the claims. For example, one party might have been
involved only in the resolved claims; it might make sense to allow an immediate
appeal of that claim rather than force that party to wait until all other issues are
decided. Enter Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows
the district court to certify an order resolving some (but not all) claims for an
immediate appeal. 13 If the district court does so, the decision becomes final and
can then be appealed without waiting for the resolution of the other claims. 14

11 E.g., Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,
233 (1945).
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 434 (1956).
13
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
14 For an in-depth study of Rule 54(b), see Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(b): Seventy-Five and Ready for
Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711 (2013).
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No such rule exists for appeals in cases consolidated under Rule 42. And the
courts of appeals developed four different approaches to the issue. 15 For
simplicity’s sake, I call them the (1) “immediate-appeals rule,” (2) the “delayedappeals rule,” (3) the “case-by-case rule,” (4) and the “presumptive rule”:
• The Immediate-Appeals Rule. One group of cases applied a bright-line
rule, holding that so long as actions are not consolidated “for all
purposes” they remain separate actions; a judgment in any one of those
actions is thus final and appealable. 16
• The Delayed-Appeals Rule. A second group of cases applied the opposite
bright-line rule: when actions have been consolidated, judgment in one
is not final or appealable (absent a Rule 54(b) certification) so long as
any the others remain pending. 17
• The Case-by-Case Rule. A third group took a case-by-case approach to
the issue that considers, among other things, “the overlap in the claims,
the relationship of the various parties, and the likelihood of the claims
being tried together.” 18
• The Presumptive Rule. Finally, the Second Circuit applied a strong
presumption that resolution of all claims in all consolidated actions is
necessary before any litigant can appeal (absent a Rule 54(b)

15 For in-depth discussions of this split, see 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.7 (2d ed. 1987); Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the
Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be: Part 1: Justiciability and Jurisdiction
(Original and Appellate), 42 UCLA L. REV. 717, 794–807 (1995) [hereinafter Steinman, Part 1]; Gaylord A.
Virden, Consolidation Under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The U.S. Courts of Appeals
Disagree on Whether Consolidation Merges the Separate Cases and Whether the Cases Remain Separately
Final for Purposes of Appeal, 141 F.R.D. 169 (1991); Marianne Fogarty, Note, The Finality of Partial Orders
in Consolidated Cases Under Rule 54(b), 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 639 (1989); Jacqueline Gerson, Comment,
The Appealability of Partial Judgments in Consolidated Case, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 170 (1990).
16 See, e.g., Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 396 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2005); Beil v.
Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1994); Kraft, Inc. v. Local Union 327, Teamsters, 683
F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1982); In re Mass. Helicopter Airlines, Inc., 469 F.2d 439, 441 (1st Cir. 1972).
17 See, e.g., Trinity Broad. Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Huene v. United
States, 743 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1984).
18 United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2003); see, e.g., United
States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Eggers v.
Clinchfield Coal Co., 11 F.3d 35, 39 (4th Cir. 1993); Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, 860 F.2d 560, 566 (3d
Cir. 1988); Ivanov-McPhee v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 927, 930 (7th Cir. 1983); Ringwald v. Harris,
675 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1982).
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certification), though that presumption could be overcome in “highly
unusual” circumstances. 19
Then came the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gelboim v. Bank of
America Corp., 20 which added further uncertainty to the issue. Gelboim involved
a different kind of consolidation: multidistrict litigation, in which cases
presenting a common question of fact are consolidated in a single district court
only for pretrial purposes. 21 The Court in Gelboim held that litigants could
immediately appeal the resolution of one action that was joined in an MDL,
regardless of the state of the other actions. 22 The Court reasoned that actions
consolidated in an MDL ordinarily retain their independent identity; they are
consolidated only for pretrial purposes, and they are returned to their originating
court if they make it to trial. 23 The resolution of a single action that was
consolidated in an MDL is accordingly a final decision, just like an independent
action that was never consolidated would be final and appealable upon
resolution of all the claims in that action. 24
Gelboim did not address what to do in cases consolidated under Rule 42. The
Supreme Court granted cert in Hall to finally resolve the issue. 25
II.

DECIDING HALL

In deciding Hall, however, the Court had no great options. Its first option
was the immediate-appeals rule, in which the judgment in an action that was
consolidated with others is final and immediately appealable regardless of
whether the other actions remain pending. This rule fits best with the existing
law on both final decisions and consolidation. Judgment in an independent
action—that is, an action filed alone and never consolidated—is a final and
appealable decision. Consolidation is not normally thought to affect the
independence of the consolidated actions—they do not merge into a single
action, but instead retain their independent identity. 26 So consolidation should

19

See, e.g., Hageman v. City Investing Co., 851 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1988).
135 S. Ct. 897 (2015).
21
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
22 Gelboim, 135 S. Ct. at 905–06.
23 See id. at 904.
24 Id.
25 Hall v. Hall, 679 Fed. Appx. 142 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 54 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2017) (No.
16-1150).
26 See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2386
(3d ed. 2018).
20
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not affect the finality of an action. This reasoning seemed especially compelling
after Gelboim; the independence of the individual actions consolidated into an
MDL was the primary reason for deeming them separately appealable.
The Court in Hall ultimately went with this immediate-appeals rule. It began
by noting that the resolution of a single action normally marks the point at which
the parties to that action can appeal. 27 Absent any change to the independent
nature of actions consolidated under Rule 42(a), resolution of a single action
would thus be final and appealable regardless of any remaining actions. 28 The
Court then rejected the argument that consolidation under Rule 42(a) merged
independent actions into a single unit; consolidation had long been understood
to not merge actions, and that understanding persisted through the creation of
Rule 42(a). 29 The Court thus adhered to this “settled understanding of the
consequences of consolidation.” 30 Given that understanding, the Court held that
“when one of several consolidated cases is finally decided, a disappointed
litigant is free to seek review of that decision in the court of appeals.”31
The immediate-appeals rule makes little practical sense, as it creates a risk
of multiple, related, and duplicative appeals. Each action in a consolidated
proceeding could be resolved at a different time. If each action is separately
appealable, then consolidated proceedings could produce several appeals.
Consolidated actions also likely involve some overlap in the facts. If each action
is separately appealable, separate appellate panels might have to become
familiar with the same record. And consolidated actions necessarily involve at
least one common question. If each action is separately appealable, those
common questions might be presented in multiple, separate appeals. Avoiding
these consequences is one of the main reasons for the general final-judgment
rule. 32 It is often more efficient (at least from the appellate court’s perspective)
to hear all related appeals at once, which requires only one panel to learn the
record and allows that panel to decide the overlapping issues in a single decision.
The immediate-appeals rule thus conflicts with one of the main reasons for the
general final-judgment rule.

27

Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1124 (2018).
Id.
29 Id. at 1125–31 (discussing the history of consolidation).
30 Id. at 1131.
31 Id.
32
See, e.g., Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 423, 428 (2013) (explaining the general benefits of the final-judgment rule, which include avoiding
multiple appeals from a single action and the presentation of the same or overlapping issues in separate appeals).
28
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The immediate-appeals rule also creates a perverse incentive. Recall that in
a single action with multiple claims, each claim is not independently appealable;
absent a Rule 54(b) certification, the appeal of any single claim must await
resolution of all claims. But litigants don’t always want to wait for the resolution
of all claims. A clever plaintiff with multiple claims could avoid this rule by
filing each claim as a separate action and then consolidating them. Resolution of
each action would be separately appealable without any requirement of securing
a Rule 54(b) certification from the district court. Granted, this tactic would add
additional costs for the plaintiff, namely filing fees. But it would allow that
plaintiff to circumvent the normal rule against appealing separate claims.
Granted, there is some merit to the immediate-appeals rule. Like in a single
action that presents multiple claims, it might occasionally make sense to allow
litigants to appeal resolution of a single action before all consolidated actions
are resolved. After all, it might be years before the other actions are resolved.
Absent a rule allowing immediate appeals, the litigants in a resolved action
would need to wait until the resolution of all actions to appeal. They would also
need to continually monitor the joint proceedings and watch for the resolution
of all other claims. This could be burdensome. More importantly, litigants who
are not sufficiently vigilant might lose their right to appeal. Litigants must file a
timely notice of appeal for the court to have jurisdiction, and they often have a
brief window after the end of district court proceedings in which to file a notice
of appeal. 33 If litigants no longer involved in the joint proceedings go too long
without noticing the final resolution of all actions, the time for filing their appeal
might run out, depriving them of their right to appeal.
There is also another, more general benefit to the immediate-appeals rule.
Allowing immediate appeals in consolidated actions does not require a new
definition of what it means for a decision to be final. Calling a judgment in an
action final and appealable, regardless of the status of any other consolidated
actions, is consistent with the common definition of a final decision. So this rule
requires no new interpretations of, or elaborations on, § 1291. It will probably
not add much to the complexity and unpredictability that currently exists in
federal appellate jurisdiction.
The Court’s other main option in deciding Hall was to approach the issue
more flexibly and adopt any of the three other rules for appeals in consolidated
actions—the delayed-appeals rule, the case-by-case rule, or the presumptive
33

See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
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rule. All of these rules would require a new elaboration on what it means for a
decision to be final. But they have the potential to produce more practically
sound outcomes; compared to the immediate-appeals rule, the three other rules
would do a better job of avoiding multiple, related, and duplicative appeals while
still allowing for immediate appeals when doing so makes practical sense.
Of these other rules, the best option is probably the delayed-appeals rule—
i.e., when actions have been consolidated, judgment in one is not final or
appealable (absent certification for immediate appeal) so long as others remain
pending. This rule would generally delay appeals in consolidated proceedings
until all of the actions are resolved. As a result, all parties, claims, and issues
would normally be addressed in a single appeal by a single panel in a single
opinion. So long as some method existed to certify the resolution of one action
for an immediate appeal, there would be some way to address unique situations
when delay was not warranted. This certification would likely be something like
Rule 54(b)—I address momentarily why the current Rule 54(b) probably doesn’t
apply—which would allow the district court to decide when an action should be
appealed. After all, the district court probably has the best sense of one action’s
relation to other consolidated actions, so the district court is probably in the best
position to decide when an immediate appeal is warranted. Indeed, several
former district court judges made this point in an amicus brief in Hall. 34
The case-by-case rule and the Second Circuit’s presumptive rule are less
than ideal. Both require the courts of appeals to decide—as part of the appeal—
whether to allow the appeal. Both accordingly create the risk of wasted time and
effort; the parties to the appeal would likely brief both jurisdiction and the
merits, but there is a chance (sometimes a significant chance) that the appeal
would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, wasting all the time, effort, and
money spent addressing the merits. While both of these approaches give the
courts flexibility to tailor the outcome to the facts of a specific case, they do so
at a potentially very high cost of wasted proceedings. The case law does not
suggest that this much flexibility is necessary.
Adopting any of these more pragmatic rules, however, creates larger
problems for federal appellate jurisdiction. None of them flows easily from the
standard definition of a final decision. For the Supreme Court to adopt any of
them, it would have had to further elaborate on what it means for a decision to

34 See Brief of Retired United States District Judges as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, Hall,
138 S. Ct. at 1118 (No. 16-1150).
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be final. This is particularly true when it comes to the case-by-case and
presumptive rules. Under those rules, resolution of a single action is sometimes
final, sometimes not, depending on the appellate court’s assessment of the case.
These elaborations and novel meanings add to the complexity and uncertainty
of federal appellate jurisdiction. 35 Although they might create a sound rule for
appeals in consolidated actions, they might also create trouble down the line for
other issues of appellate jurisdiction. Courts in subsequent cases might have to
wrestle with the new definition of a final decision in a different context. More
likely, new definitions of and elaborations on what constitutes a final decision
would provide grist for future litigation about whether some other district court
decision is a final one.
There is one additional problem with the delayed-appeals rule: it would
likely require a novel and stretched reading of Rule 54(b). Were the Court to
adopt one of these more pragmatic rules, it almost certainly would want to allow
for district courts to certify an action for immediate appeal when the situation
warrants. Before Hall, courts had used Rule 54(b) to do so. But by its plain terms,
that Rule applies only to “an action” that involves multiple claims or multiple
parties: “[W]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as
to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.” Rule 54(b) thus does not
clearly apply to the resolution of individual actions that are consolidated with
others. Again, each action consolidated with other actions retains its separate,
independent identity. And in the situation at issue here, all—not some—of the
claims in a single action have been resolved. To hold otherwise requires ignoring
the Rule 54(b)’s text.
The Supreme Court had a few other options in Hall v. Hall. A third would
have been to focus on the final-judgment rule’s use of the word “proceedings”—
i.e., a final decision is normally one that marks the end of district court
proceedings. The Court could plausibly have said that when actions are
consolidated, the relevant proceedings are the joint proceedings of all the

35
See generally, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and
Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1998) (discussing the complications and uncertainty that
have sprung from the collateral-order doctrine, which was based on an interpretation of what it means for a
decision to be final); see also Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review
in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1660–61 (2011) [hereinafter Non-Discretionary
Interlocutory Appellate Review] (recounting criticisms of the current system); Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing
Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1238–39 (2007) [hereinafter Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction]
(same).
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consolidated actions. The end of district court proceedings, in other words,
would be the end of the joint proceedings. So any appeals must wait until those
joint proceedings are resolved. By changing the definition of proceedings in this
context, the Court could have avoided modifying what it means for a decision to
be final.
Fair enough. But this third option has its own problems. First, it requires a
new definition of proceedings, one that the Court has not used up to this point.
As the experience with new definitions of a final decision shows, adding new
definitions to a term to reach a reasonable resolution in a single case can have
repercussions for future cases. Second, this option creates a tension with
Gelboim. Recall that in Gelboim the Court held that the end of proceedings in a
single action consolidated for an MDL was final. 36 The litigants did not need to
wait until the entire MDL proceedings were over. 37 So instead of giving “final”
a new meaning, this holding would have required giving proceedings a new and
novel meaning. And third—just like any of the just-discussed pragmatic rules
for consolidated actions—it would likely require a stretched reading of Rule
54(b).
This leaves one final option: the Supreme Court could have changed what it
means for cases to be consolidated. It could have held that the consolidation of
cases for all purposes merges those cases together—the multiple actions become
one. This interpretation would have avoided the problems of defining finality
and would allow a straightforward adoption of the bright-line delayed-appeals
rule. And because the joint proceedings would become a single action, Rule
54(b) would comfortably apply.
But this last option simply ducks the jurisdiction question. And changing the
meaning of consolidation could have many consequences outside of the
appellate jurisdiction context. Joan Steinman’s work on consolidation
illuminates the many procedural matters that consolidation might affect,
including justiciability, personal jurisdiction, venue, discovery, choice of law,
the right to a jury trial, and attorneys’ fees (not to mention appellate

36
37

135 S. Ct. 897, 905–06 (2015).
Id.
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jurisdiction). 38 Avoiding the jurisdictional problem might simply create more
problems for consolidated actions in the future.
III. A LOSE-LOSE CASE FOR APPELLATE JURISDICTION
So the Supreme Court did not have any great options in Hall. It could have
narrowly construed § 1291 and adopted a sub-optimal rule. Or it could have
approached § 1291 more expansively to create a pragmatically sound rule that
would further complicate the law of federal appellate jurisdiction. (Or it could
have ducked the issue by redefining proceedings or consolidation, but I’ll limit
myself to the first two.)
Hall is not unique in this respect. When interpreting § 1291, courts are often
pulled in two irreconcilable directions. Courts sometimes want to create clear
and predictable rules of appellate jurisdiction. 39 After all, the entry of a final
decision gives litigants both a right to appeal and a brief window of time in which
to file that appeal. Litigants accordingly must be able to identify a final decision;
otherwise, they risk losing their opportunity to appeal. Clear and predictable
appellate jurisdiction rules also minimize side litigation over procedural matters,
which can distract from the merits. Courts often satisfy this need for clarity and
predictability by giving the term “final decision” a narrow and strict meaning,
invoking the oft-given definition of a decision that marks the end of district court
proceedings.
Other times, they don’t stick to this narrow and strict meaning. Modern
litigation cannot survive on appeals that come only after the end of district court
proceedings; matters are occasionally too complicated and the stakes are
occasionally too high to delay all appeals until that point. So courts also
occasionally interpret § 1291 expansively to create flexible rules that meet the
needs of modern federal litigation. 40 Doing so often requires elaborating on what

38 See generally Steinman, Part 1, supra note 15; Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the
Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be: Part 2: Non-Jurisdictional Matters, 42
UCLA L. REV. 967 (1995).
39 But see generally Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011);
Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of Their Beholders,
91 NEB. L. REV. 387 (2012).
40 See generally, e.g., Bryan Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death of the Balancing
Approach and the Inescapable Allure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 371, 385–410
(2017) [hereinafter Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie] (discussing various areas in which the courts have used a
pragmatic balancing approach to resolve issues of appellate jurisdiction).
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it means for a decision to be final, giving the term new and sometimes
unintuitive meanings.
Both of these forces—towards clarity and towards flexibility—are not
without problems. When courts interpret § 1291 narrowly to produce clear and
predictable rules, they sometimes produce pragmatically unsound outcomes. But
when courts take the more flexible approach to § 1291 and interpret it broadly,
they inject complexity and uncertainty into an already complicated area of law.
The law in this area is already often maligned for its complexity and
unpredictability. 41 Giving additional meanings to § 1291 adds to this problem.
Hall is thus another example of the Supreme Court’s problematic efforts to
create the law of federal appellate jurisdiction. But Hall also illustrates the other
way forward: rulemaking. The Rules Committee has the power to address this
matter through rulemaking. 42 And the issue in Hall is an ideal one for
rulemaking. Indeed, at oral argument, the Court even seemed to recognize the
appropriateness of rulemaking in this context, with the Justices asking counsel
for the petitioners how he would argue his case to the Rules Committee. 43 In the
opinion itself, the Court suggested (once again) that creating novel rules of
appellate jurisdiction be left to the Committee. 44
The Rules Committee could address appeals in consolidated actions without
any regard to adhering to the oft-given definition of a final decision; it could
instead craft rules designed specifically for this situation. 45 It could, for example,
generally delay appeals in consolidated actions but also create a Rule 54(b)-like
power for district courts to certify certain actions for an immediate appeal. It
might be as simple as adding a provision to Rule 42 that, unless the district court
orders otherwise, a decision resolving an action joined or consolidated with
others under the rule is not final until the resolution of all consolidated actions.
Or the rule could be more specific, providing that a decision resolving an action
41 E.g., Pollis, Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review, supra note 35; Steinman, Reinventing
Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 35.
42 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(e), 2072 (2012). Technically the power is the Supreme Court’s, which has
assigned to the Rules Committee the responsibility for amending the rules.
43
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118 (2018) (No. 16-1150).
44 Hall, 138 S. Ct. at 1131; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1714 (2017) (suggesting
that changes to appellate jurisdiction come from rulemaking); Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100,
114 (2009) (same).
45 For further discussion on rules-based reform of appellate jurisdiction, see Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent
and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 259 (2001);
Bryan Lammon, Cumulative Finality, 52 GA. L. REV. 767, 827–30 (2018); Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra
note 40, at 415–18; Bryan Lammon, Perlman Appeals After Mohawk, 84 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2016).
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is not final until the resolution of all consolidated actions and then allowing the
district court to certify the resolution of an action for an immediate appeal if
certain conditions are met (such as the “no just reason for delay” requirement of
Rule 54(b)).
Hall’s sticking to the straightforward reading of § 1291 and adopting a rule
that doesn’t work all that well might ultimately be its biggest benefit. The
pragmatically unsound immediate-appeals rule—though not ideal—might force
the Rules Committee’s hand.
CONCLUSION
Hall illustrates the tension inherent in the judge-made law of federal
appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court had the choice between creating a
clear but sub-optimal rule or creating a more pragmatic rule that might raise new
problems in the future. It was a classic lose-lose scenario. Hall also shows the
other way forward: rulemaking. The federal courts alone cannot resolve the
tension between clarity and flexibility in this area of the law. It’s up to the Rules
Committee to act.

